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This paper analyzes the conditions under which the level of hate speech (ex-
pressing hostility towards racial and other minorities) in society can influence
whether individuals commit hate crimes against minorities. More generally, we
explore the conditions under which speech can influence behavior by revealing so-
cial attitudes. We propose a model in which potential offenders care not only about
the intrinsic benefits from the crime and the expected costs of punishment, but also
about the esteem conferred by like-minded individuals. The number of such indi-
viduals is uncertain, but can (in certain circumstances) be inferred from the level
of hate speech. We assume that individuals trade off their expressive utility from
voicing their true opinions against the costs imposed by formal and/or informal
sanctions on hate speech. We characterize the separating and pooling equilibria of
this asymmetric information game, and show that the costs of engaging in speech
affect what views are expressed in equilibrium. Then, we specify a set of condi-
tions where individuals have common prior beliefs, engage in Bayesian inference,
and are risk-neutral in esteem under which speech is neutral, i.e. has no effect on
behavior. Then, we relax these assumptions, taking into account the relevant psy-
chological evidence, and derive the impact of hate speech on hate crime using a
variety of different formulations. We conclude that those assumptions that appear
to have the strongest empirical support (the correspondence bias in inference and
the concavity of utility in esteem) imply that raising the costs of engaging in hate
speech will deter hate crime.
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1) Introduction 
In the summer of 1999, a former Indiana University undergraduate named Benjamin 
Smith embarked on a series of drive-by shootings, targeting minorities in Illinois and Indiana. He 
began by firing on a group of Orthodox Jews in Chicago, injuring several. Then, he drove to 
Evanston, IL, where he shot and killed Ricky Byrdsong, an African-American college coach out 
walking with two of his children. Later that day, Smith proceeded to Bloomington, IN, where he 
shot and killed Won-Joon Yoon, a Korean doctoral student at Indiana University. Smith 
eventually committed suicide following a police chase.1 That same summer, Buford Furrow, Jr., 
opened fire on a Jewish community center in Los Angeles, injuring several children (an act that 
he described as a “wake-up call for Americans to kill Jews”). Later, he shot and killed a Pilipino-
American mailman, before eventually giving himself up to police.2 Less than a year later, 
Richard Baumhammers shot racial minorities in the Pittsburgh area, killing five. His victims 
were of African-American, Jewish, Chinese, Indian, and Vietnamese origin.3 In the fall of 2001, 
a few weeks after the September 11 attacks, Mark Stroman shot and killed Vasudev Patel, an 
Indian immigrant gas station attendant, in Mesquite, Texas, apparently believing him to be a 
Muslim. He is also charged with the earlier crimes of murdering a Pakistani immigrant, Waqar 
Hasan, four days after the September 11 attack, and wounding a Bangladeshi immigrant, Rais 
Bhuiyan, the following week.4 
Such deadly rampages are rare, but less serious hate crimes (i.e. crimes motivated by 
racial or other hatred) are quite common. The FBI reported 8063 hate crimes in 2000, mostly 
property offenses and assaults. However, this data suffers from gaps and inconsistencies in 
reporting by local law enforcement agencies, as well as from general underreporting, and other 
estimates are much higher.5  
                                                 
1 See e.g. E. Ferkenhoff and M. Ko, “Killer’s Trail of Blood,” Chicago Tribune, July 5, 1999. 
2 See e.g. M. Lait and N. Zamichow, “Valley Shooting Suspect Surrenders, Confesses,” Los Angeles Times, August 
12, 1999, and B. Rector, “The Legacy of Hate Crime Is Passion with which to Fight It,” Los Angeles Times, 
February 4, 2001. 
3 See e.g. K. E. Finkelstein, “5 People Are Shot to Death, and a Lawyer Is Arrested,” New York Times, April 29, 
2000.  
4 See, e.g., Associated Press, “Immigrant Store Owner’s Killer Gets Death Sentence,” The Commercial Appeal, 
April 5, 2002; Tim Wyatt, “Killer of Gas Clerk Gets Death Penalty,” Dallas Morning News, April 5, 2002. Stroman 
allegedly confessed to all three crimes, id., and allegedly told others he committed nine crimes in the time period 
and was planning more. See Tim Wyatt, “Gas Clerk Killer is Convicted,” Dallas Morning News, April 3, 2002. 
5 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hate Crime Statistics, 2000, and Southern Poverty Law Center, “Discounting 
Hate,” Intelligence Report, Winter, 2001, available online at: 
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The killing rampages, however, provide particular insight into the difficulty these crimes 
pose for economic analysis. The central focus of the economics of crime is on deterrence (e.g. 
Becker, 1968), yet the perpetrators of these crimes seem to have been undeterred both by a high 
probability of detection and by approximately maximal sanctions (death or life imprisonment).6,7 
Nor does economic analysis seem to “explain” such crimes, except in the almost tautological and 
generally unhelpful manner of saying that these individuals have a strong “taste” for committing 
these violent acts.8 While it is undoubtedly true that tastes play a major role in this type of 
behavior, we argue below that incorporating additional variables can provide insights into the 
policy tools available to combat these types of crimes. 
What the conventional view ignores, we believe, is the degree to which the perpetrators 
of these crimes are driven by the desire for fame among those who share their ideology. Smith, 
Furrow, and Stroman belonged to organized hate groups (the World Church of the Creator, 
Aryan Nations, and Aryan Brotherhood, respectively), and Baumhammers was the self-styled 
leader of an anti-immigration political party.9 Although these offenders are likely to have 
expected approval for their crimes from their close associates, the opportunity for fame exists 
among a much wider network than one’s immediate circle. Given the scope of modern 
communications, individuals committing hate crimes can expect to gain widespread acclaim 
from sympathetic strangers who live far from the locations of the crimes.10 
To capture this notion of fame as a motivation, we draw on the “esteem theory” (Pettit, 
1990; McAdams, 1997; Brennan and Pettit, 2000; Cowen, 2002) from the economics of social 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.tolerance.org/news/article_hate.jsp?id=341 (estimating 50,000 hate crimes annually). The Center has 
been tracking hate crimes since 1981. 
6 Furrow, Baumhammers, and Stroman have all been convicted and sentenced to life in prison or death. See the 
articles cited supra note 4, H. Weinstein, “Furrow Gets 5 Life Terms for Racist Rampage,” Los Angeles Times, 
March 27, 2001, and Anonymous, “Racist Killer of 5 Gets Death Sentence,” New York Times, May 12, 2001. 
7 To a lesser extent, economic analysis discusses incapacitation as a means of preventing crime, but incapacitation is 
at best a partial solution because there is no way to predict who is going to commit such crimes. 
8 The attribution of such crimes to the insanity of the perpetrators is a variant of the “tastes” explanation, and thus is 
equally unhelpful. 
9 See the articles cited supra notes 1-4, and also e.g. A. Beeler and E. Osnos, “Puzzling Path Down Road to 
Racism,” Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1999 and Anonymous, “Suspect Saw Immigration as Disastrous to Whites,” 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 3, 2000. 
10 In sentencing Baumhammers, the judge explicitly drew attention to the role of racist web sites in inspiring the 
rampage – see “Statement by Judge Manning in Baumhammers’ Sentencing,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 
7, 2001. Stroman claimed to have expected broad support for his post 9/11 killings. He said in a television interview 
that he “did what every American wanted to do but didn’t” because they “didn’t have the nerve.” Robert E. Pierre, 
“Victims of Hate, Now Feeling Forgotten,” Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2002. His defense lawyer told the jury 
hearing Stroman’s case that he “thought he was being a hero. . . He thought that America would praise him and pin a 
medal on his chest.” Tim Wyatt, “Killer of Gas Clerk Gets Death Penalty,” Dallas Morning News, April 5, 2002. 
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norms.11 This theory posits that the esteem of others, like conventional consumption goods, 
enters into individuals’ utility functions as an intrinsic motivation. However, the arguments we 
develop are essentially unaffected if esteem is assumed to be valued instrumentally because it 
secures more consumption goods (see McAdams (2000, pp. 346-47)).12 
While the introduction of esteem as a motivation may involve some loss of theoretical 
parsimony, we argue that it enables us to explain phenomena that are otherwise puzzling, and to 
generate significant new insights. In particular, it enables us to extend the standard economic 
theory of crime in a direction that can encompass the most extreme examples of hate-motivated 
criminal behavior, of the kind highlighted above. Our other aim is to contribute to the economic 
literature on speech and its regulation (Posner, 1986; Loury, 1994; Kuran, 1995; Rasmusen, 
1998; Morris, 2001). We argue that, when individuals care about esteem, speech can influence 
conduct in certain circumstances by providing information about what behavior others esteem or 
disesteem. We elaborate the model in the context of hate speech,13 identifying conditions under 
which the prevalence of hate speech may affect the expected utility from committing hate 
crimes. 
In addition to the esteem assumption, the model we propose assumes that individuals 
have incomplete information about the basis on which others confer esteem (or disesteem), and 
that individuals gain “expressive utility” from articulating their true views. Thus, in the absence 
of speech costs, individuals’ decisions produce a separating equilibrium, where individuals 
express their views and everyone can perfectly infer the amount of esteem (or disesteem) that a 
given behavior will produce. In the presence of speech costs, however, some speech may be 
deterred, the result being a (partially or perfectly) pooling equilibrium that creates uncertainty 
                                                 
11 The esteem theory is typically used as an explanation for the voluntary private provision of public goods, an issue 
that we do not focus on in this paper (see McAdams (1995)). 
12 In this latter interpretation, the esteem assumption can simply be regarded as a reduced-form representation of 
effects that would hold even in the absence of esteem considerations. For instance, it is possible that a higher 
estimate of the number of esteemers may lead potential offenders to believe that they are less likely to be caught or 
punished (as witnesses, the police, and the jury may be more sympathetic), and so lead to more hate crimes. While it 
would be possible to develop such a model with no explicit reference to esteem, we believe that our formulation 
leads to more general insights about the effects of speech on conduct. 
13 Hate speech has been variously defined. Examples include: “speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of 
race, religion, ethnicity or national origin” (Rosenfeld, 2001, p. 2); or “expression that abuses or degrades others on 
account of their racial, ethnic, or religious identity.” (Heyman, 1996, p. ix). We focus our discussion on racist 
speech, though the analysis applies to the broader category (including, for instance, hate speech based on sexual 
orientation). In addition, we argue below that our analysis supports defining hate speech with an emphasis on that 
which conveys, directly or indirectly, the message that the speaker will esteem one who commits a criminal offense 
against members of the targeted group. 
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about true social attitudes. We begin by characterizing these speech equilibria, showing that the 
costs of speech can affect what views are expressed in equilibrium.  
To clarify the conditions under which speech can influence behavior by signaling 
attitudes, we first derive a neutrality result.  If individuals have common prior beliefs, engage in 
Bayesian inference, and are risk-neutral in esteem, then speech will not affect conduct. This 
result can be extended to cases where individuals have randomly dispersed priors or private 
signals. However, any further departure from these assumptions leads, in general, to the non-
neutrality of speech; thus, the costs of engaging in hate speech can have an impact on the level of 
hate crime. 
The paper then presents a number of alternative formulations. Particularly because the 
nature of the hate crimes discussed above may call standard rationality assumptions into 
question, we place considerable emphasis on the psychological evidence regarding such issues as 
cognitive biases in inference. Here, we briefly summarize only the results of the most plausible 
alternative assumptions: If we assume that individuals’ priors or private signals are positively 
correlated with their tastes for committing hate crimes, then raising the costs of hate speech will 
increase the level of hate crime. If we assume  that individuals deviate from Bayesian inference 
by exhibiting what psychologists term the “correspondence bias,” then raising the costs of hate 
speech will reduce hate crimes (whether or not priors are common, random, or correlated). 
Finally, if individuals are risk-averse in esteem, then raising the costs of hate speech will, by 
creating greater uncertainty, also reduce hate crimes. 
These results are intended to be illustrative of the likely range of possibilities, rather than 
to be conclusive. We hope that one contribution of this paper is to clarify and sharpen the 
empirical questions that are relevant for understanding the effects of speech on conduct, and on 
which future research on this topic within economics, psychology, and law should focus. It 
should also be emphasized that none of these results, by themselves, entail that government or 
private regulation of hate speech is beneficial, as we do not address the costs associated with 
public or private regulation of speech. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Related literature is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
presents the paper’s basic model and derives the neutrality result. Section 4 then relaxes the 
model’s assumptions one at a time, and discusses the various results, emphasizing the most 
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plausible alternative assumptions. Section 5 discusses some practical issues related to public or 
private efforts to increase the costs of hate speech, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2) Related Literature 
The growing literature by legal scholars on hate speech focuses primarily on doctrinal 
issues, particularly the extent to which hate speech regulation can be reconciled with existing 
First Amendment jurisprudence (e.g. Heyman, 1996). Rosenfeld (2001) adopts a comparative 
perspective, noting that many democracies regulate hate speech more extensively than does the 
United States, and concludes that the US approach is less justifiable than the competing models. 
Another strand of the legal literature (e.g. Matsuda et al., 1993) focuses on the psychological and 
dignitary harms suffered by the targets of hate speech. In contrast, our focus is on the effects of 
hate speech on the behavior of perpetrators of hate crimes.14  
Within economics, a literature on speech analyzes how reputational effects help 
determine what messages individuals are willing to send in equilibrium; prominent examples 
include Loury (1994), Kuran (1995) and Morris (2001). However, there is virtually no economic 
literature examining hate speech and its possible consequences. Exceptions include Hylton 
(1996), who draws on Mill’s utilitarian philosophy to discuss the circumstances in which hate 
speech should be regulated. He argues that, in contrast to a perspective that enshrines freedom of 
speech as a “natural right,” utilitarianism can countenance restrictions on speech when the 
benefits from such regulation (or the harms averted) are sufficiently large. Cooter (2000, p. 323) 
argues that hate speech should receive a lower level of constitutional protection than other kinds 
of speech in certain circumstances. Moreover, the general issue of hatred and related concerns 
about violent activism have been attracting growing interest from economists (see Glaeser (2002) 
and Stamland and Shogren (2002)). None of this research, however, addresses the particular 
issue analyzed in this paper. 
 Perhaps the most closely related literature is that on the economics of speech regulation. 
Posner (1986) analyzes a landmark First Amendment case,15 using an approach that weighs the 
benefits from regulation (i.e. the harm averted, appropriately discounted) against the costs (such 
                                                 
14 McKinnon (1993) and others have argued that there exists a link between pornography and violence, a claim that 
may seem analogous to ours. However, these authors do not specify a precise mechanism through which such an 
effect may occur. 
15 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201 (2d. Cir. 1950). 
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as the losses from legal error). While offering some intriguing suggestions (such as the role of 
appeals to listeners’ self-interest), Posner does not provide a systematic theory of how speech 
leads to action. Rasmusen (1998) applies an economic approach to the regulation of the 
desecration of symbols (such as flags). He argues that such desecration should be banned 
whenever those who experience psychic costs from it would be willing to pay more to prevent it 
than the perpetrators would pay to carry it out. In contrast, our focus is on the effects of hate 
speech on conduct; we therefore set aside the psychic utility and disutility that may be 
experienced by the speakers and targets.  
 
3) The Basic Model 
 3.1) Assumptions  
 3.1.1) The Model Of Speech 
 Assume that there is a continuum of individuals belonging to the majority ethnic group in 
society. Let [0, 1] represent the space of racial views held by these individuals. Individual i’s 
racial views are denoted by xi* ∈[0, 1]; individuals differ only in their racial views, and an 
individual’s xi* will be referred to as her “type” in the analysis that follows. Higher values of xi* 
are assumed to represent views that are relatively more hostile to minorities. There is a subset   
[γ, 1] of views that represent neo-Nazi or other racist positions; γ ∈(0, 1) is a threshold view, 
above which individuals approve of hate crimes against minorities. Let ρ ∈(0, 1) be the 
proportion of the population that has views xi* ≥ γ (i.e. who approve of hate crimes). The basic 
informational assumption is that the xi*’s, and hence ρ, are not publicly observed. All that is 
observable is the view that each individual chooses to express publicly. Individual i’s expressed 
view is denoted by vi ∈[0, 1]; this is the message space, and is assumed to be identical to the type 
space.16 
 In choosing a view to express, each individual is assumed to maximize a payoff function 
that consists of three components. The first of these is an “expressive” utility one gains by 
expressing the view one holds (as discussed informally in Kuran (1995, pp. 30-35)). This is 
                                                 
16 The assumption that the type space and message space are identical may appear to be restrictive. However, 
allowing individuals a wider range of expression than [0, 1] would not fundamentally affect the nature of the 
outcomes, given that the assumption of “expressive utility” tends to anchor opinions expressed in equilibrium close 
to the true type space. In such a model, though, the levels of sanctions required to induce pooling equilibria may be 
higher than in the results below. 
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captured by the quadratic preferences – (vi – xi*)2. Thus, the farther is one’s expressed view from 
one’s true position, the greater the expressive loss. This is somewhat analogous to the use of 
spatial preferences in political economy models to represent the “ideological” loss when the 
implemented policy diverges from one’s ideal point. There, though, the policy is a public good, 
whereas here it is an individual-specific choice of expression that is compared to the ideal point. 
Note also that the assumption of expressive utility entails that this is not a cheap-talk model 
(unlike that in Morris (2001)). 
 The other components of individuals’ utility are the formal and informal sanctions that 
are imposed for certain kinds of speech.17 A more complete analysis would endogenize the 
determination and enforcement of these sanctions; here, they are simply taken as exogenous. The 
level of formal sanctions is denoted by CF. It is assumed that the government can condition 
formal sanctions only on the views expressed by a particular individual. That is, it can outlaw 
particular forms of speech, but not the corresponding thoughts (either because of constitutional 
restrictions on the kinds of laws that can be passed, or due to the difficulty of proof). Moreover, 
we assume that constitutional constraints also prevent the government from outlawing speech to 
the left of γ (i.e. it cannot ban speech that does not belong to the most extremist subset of feasible 
expression). Thus, CF = CF(vi) for each individual i. On the other hand, informal sanctions 
(imposed by private actors) can be conditioned on all the observables (vi and the expressed views 
of all other individuals, denoted v-i) and on any inferences about true views that can be drawn 
from these observations. In particular, the informal sanctions imposed on i depend on the 
posterior belief held by other individuals about i’s true views. This belief is denoted by µi, where 
µi ≡ Pr[xi* ≥ γ  vi, v-i]. Informal sanctions on individual i are denoted by CI(µi(vi, v-i)). To 
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the informal sanctions are only applied when µi = 1 
(although this is not fundamental to the results below). 
 The total payoff of individual i, denoted Ui, can be expressed as: 
Ui = – (vi – xi*)2 – CF(vi) – CI(µi(vi, v-i))                                        (1) 
                                                 
17 In Kuran’s terminology (1995, pp. 26-30), these two components together constitute one’s “reputational utility.” 
We omit discussion of what Kuran terms “intrinsic utility,” where an individual gains utility from having his 
expression influence public policy, because there is a continuum of individuals and each can be assumed to be 
negligible with respect to the determination of public policy. 
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A strategy for each individual is simply a choice of view to express: vi ∈[0, 1]. Whenever 
possible, each individual also forms a belief about the true views of every other individual. The 
game thus has two stages: 
1) Each individual (noncooperatively) chooses a view vi ∈[0,1] to express; 
2) The government and private actors impose formal and informal sanctions (if any), 
respectively, on each individual.18 
An equilibrium can be defined as follows: 
Definition of Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a profile of expressed views (vi’s) and beliefs 
(µi’s) such that each individual’s payoff is maximized – i.e. 
vi = arg max Ui(xi*; vi, v-i)             
and beliefs are formed using Bayes’ Rule whenever possible. In particular (whenever it is 
possible to form nontrivial beliefs), 
µi = 1 only if xi*∈[γ, 1] and µi = 0 only if xi*∈[0, γ] 
 Given an equilibrium of this nature (i.e. a choice of vi by each individual, and the 
consequent inferences concerning the true racial attitudes of the population), there will exist a 
(possibly degenerate) probability distribution for ρ. Let F: (0, 1) → [0, 1] be the cdf of this 
distribution, and f(⋅) be its pdf. For the moment, we assume that these distributions are common 
knowledge, and that no individual receives any signals or information regarding the true value of 
ρ, other than that summarized by these distributions. Thus, each individual has the same beliefs 
concerning ρ. These assumptions will be relaxed in later sections of the paper. 
 3.1.2) The Potential Offender’s Decision  
 Now consider the decision problem faced by a potential offender who is contemplating 
whether to engage in a hate crime.19 Let B be the intrinsic utility she derives from committing the 
act, even in the absence of esteem from others. Let C be the disutility from the costs associated 
with being detected (such as imprisonment), discounted by the probability of apprehension. If 
this were the entire story, then (assuming that the default payoff from not committing the crime 
is 0) the individual would commit the crime whenever B > C. Such a simple account would leave 
                                                 
18 The sanction is obviously costly for the individual on whom it is imposed, and it is to these costs that CF and CI 
refer. Clearly, there are also costs of enforcing sanctions, but these, and the associated free rider problems with the 
enforcement of informal sanctions, are not addressed here. 
19 Typically, such an individual would presumably be drawn from among those with views in [γ, 1], but this does not 
matter for the analysis. 
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no scope for policy interventions of any kind, assuming that the probability of detection is 
already high, that the punishment is already approximately maximal, and that it is not possible to 
manipulate preferences to influence B. 
 However, the novel element of the theory developed in this paper is to introduce the 
assumption that potential offenders care not only about B and C, but also about the esteem they 
anticipate receiving from like-minded individuals if they commit the crime. That is, a potential 
offender is assumed to derive utility from the esteem of those who approve of hate crimes. While 
an individual is likely to value more highly the esteem received from close associates than from 
strangers, we assume that individuals also place some positive value on the esteem of strangers 
(“fame”). Moreover, it is this “stranger esteem” that is theoretically significant. The theory 
developed here focuses on uncertainty regarding esteem and it is the number of esteeming 
strangers that is not known with certainty, so a potential offender must use the public information 
derived from the expressed views of individuals to estimate ρ (i.e. the number of esteemers). 
Because there is little or no uncertainty regarding esteem from close associates, we generally 
ignore “associate esteem.” To the extent that there is any uncertainty over the esteem one 
receives from associates, then the analysis of this paper applies to that esteem as well. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that each esteemer confers a fixed, known “amount” of 
esteem, normalized to 1.20 The utility derived by the potential offender is denoted by u(ρ), where 
∫= 1
0
(2)                                                      )()()( dzzfzuu ρ  
No particular assumptions are made at this stage about the shape of u(ρ), other than that it is 
increasing (i.e. u′(⋅) > 0); this is virtually definitional, being simply equivalent to positing that 
esteem is a good, in the sense of being positively valued. More specific assumptions will be 
made in later sections of the paper. 
When the potential offender cares about the esteem she anticipates receiving, her net 
payoff from the crime (assuming a 0 default payoff if the individual does not commit the crime), 
denoted by V, is:21 
                                                 
20 The results would not change fundamentally if the “amount” of esteem conferred were also subject to uncertainty. 
21 This formulation requires that the utility function is separable in the intrinsic (net) utility (B – C) and the utility 
from esteem. Note that, as (B – C) is defined in utility terms, it can implicitly accommodate risk aversion or risk 
preference over these net gains. The approach adopted here is to take the probability of detection and the sanction as 
given, and to focus solely on the effects of changes in the expected utility of esteem. However, in a more general 
setting where all policy instruments are chosen simultaneously, there may be some interactions between the risk to 
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          V  ∫+−= 1
0
(3)                                                     )()( dzzfzuCB
Thus, she will commit the crime whenever V > 0. This concludes the description of the basic 
model. The next subsection examines the consequences of speech regulation. 
3.2) Speech Equilibria 
Having described the assumptions of the basic model, we now turn to the equilibria of the 
speech game. It should be noted that the aim below is not to characterize the equilibria in all 
possible circumstances, but to highlight those of greatest relevance for the argument of the paper. 
3.2.1) Equilibrium with No Sanctions 
Consider first the case where there are neither government nor private sanctions on hate 
speech. It follows straightforwardly that: 
Remark 1: Suppose that CF = CI = 0. Then, the equilibrium involves perfect separation: 
     vi = xi* ∀xi*∈[0, 1] 
     µi = 1 if vi∈[γ, 1] and µi = 0 otherwise 
Thus, the equilibrium involves sincere expression: each individual expresses her true viewpoint, 
and there is no uncertainty in equilibrium about the number of haters. 
3.2.2) Equilibrium with Formal Sanctions Only 
 Suppose that, as before, CI = 0, but that CF > 0. Specifically, the government imposes a 
strictly positive sanction on any individual who expresses a view vi ∈(γ, 1].22 It is assumed that 
the penalty is sufficiently large to deter all violations in equilibrium. Then, the “sincere 
expression” equilibrium characterized above is modified as follows: 
Remark 2: Suppose that CF > 0 and CI = 0. Then, the equilibrium is: 
     vi = xi* ∀xi*∈[0, γ) 
     vi = γ  ∀xi*∈[γ, 1] 
     µi = 1 if vi = γ, and µi = 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                             
the potential offender generated by the choice of sanction and detection probability on the one hand, and uncertainty 
about racial attitudes on the other. For instance, it may be optimal to set these so as to increase the overall risk borne 
by a (risk-averse) potential offender and thus maximize deterrence. Alternatively, the risk borne by the potential 
offender may be viewed as a social cost (see Polinsky and Shavell (1979)). These issues are not pursued here.  




Thus, those individuals whose xi* is within the permitted range of speech engage in sincere 
expression. The haters, on the other hand, make the most extreme statement (γ) that is consistent 
with the law. Any rational observer can infer straightforwardly that those making statement γ are 
all haters; thus, the fraction of haters in the population, ρ, is revealed in this equilibrium. 
However, the distribution of true views among these haters remains hidden because the haters 
pool among themselves.  
 3.2.3) Equilibria with Informal Sanctions Only 
 Now suppose that CF = 0, while CI > 0. Recall the assumption that these sanctions are 
strictly positive only when µi = 1; thus, the analysis here focuses on characterizing certain 
equilibria of this game for particular ranges of values of CI(1). The first point to note is that 
sincere expression is not an equilibrium when CI(1) > 0: 
Remark 3: Suppose that CF = 0 and CI(1) > 0. Then, no perfectly separating equilibrium exists. 
Proof: Recall the equilibrium belief in the perfectly separating equilibrium characterized in 
Remark 1: µi = 1 if vi∈[γ, 1] and µi = 0 otherwise. Given this, for any CI(1) > 0, 
individuals with xi* = γ will always be able to find an ε sufficiently small that they prefer 
to deviate to vi = γ – ε (which gives a payoff of – ε2 that is arbitrarily close to zero, while 
the separating equilibrium gives a payoff of – CI(1) < 0). 
 As there does not exist any perfectly separating equilibrium, what kinds of equilibria do 
exist? First, consider relatively low values of CI(1). The following result can be derived: 
Proposition 1: Suppose that CF = 0 and that CI(1) > 0 is sufficiently small, with CI(1) = (xR – γ)2 
for some xR ∈[0, γ). Then, there exists a partially separating equilibrium, where: 
     vi = xi* if xi*∈[0, xR] or if xi*∈[γ, 1] 
     vi = xR if xi*∈(xR, γ) 
     µi = 1 if vi > xR, and µi = 0 otherwise     
Proof:  Consider individuals with xi* = γ. The equilibrium payoff is – CI(1); the payoff from 
deviating to some vi > xR is clearly lower. The payoff from deviating to vi = xR is – (xR – 
γ)2. This equilibrium thus requires that CI(1) ≤ (xR – γ)2. If this holds, then, a fortiori, any 
individual with xi* > γ will also satisfy the equilibrium. 
Consider a nonhater whose view is arbitrarily close to xi* = γ on the left (i.e. xi* = γ – ε). 
Such an individual has equilibrium payoff – (xR – γ + ε)2; the payoff from deviating to vi 
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= γ – ε is – CI(1). As ε → 0, the equilibrium requires that CI(1) ≥ (xR – γ)2. If this holds, 
then, a fortiori, any individual with xi* < γ – ε will also satisfy the equilibrium. 
The condition above (CI(1) = (xR – γ)2) ensures that both these requirements are satisfied 
simultaneously. 
The intuition here is that both those with views farthest from those of the haters, and the haters 
themselves, speak sincerely. However, those nonhaters whose views are closer to γ express a 
position that differs from their true views. By moving their expression just far enough that haters 
find it unpalatable to dissimulate and pool with them, they avoid being confused with haters. 
Given that they will be identified in equilibrium anyway, haters simply engage in sincere 
expression. Thus, low levels of informal sanctions do not lead to greater uncertainty about 
hatred. 
The equilibrium characterized above ceases to exist when CI(1) is sufficiently large. 
Suppose that xR = 0; then, individuals with xi* = γ will deviate when CI(1) > γ2, as the deviation 
payoff (– γ2) exceeds the equilibrium payoff (– CI(1)). For larger values of CI(1), the equilibrium 
is: 
Proposition 2: Suppose that CF = 0 and that CI(1) is sufficiently large (in particular, CI(1) > 1). 
Then, there exists a perfect pooling equilibrium: 
     vi = 0 ∀xi*∈[0, 1] 
     µi = µρ if vi = 0, and µi = 1 if vi > 0 
Proof: Consider the most extreme haters (individuals with xi* = 1). Their equilibrium payoff is  
– (0 – 1) 2 = – 1; their highest possible payoff from deviating is by setting vi = 1, which 
yields a payoff of – CI(1) < – 1. Thus, they will satisfy the equilibrium. This holds a 
fortiori for any xi* < 1. 
The intuition here is that the informal sanctions are so costly to those believed to be haters that 
even the most extreme haters prefer to send the message vi = 0; thus, the entire population pools. 
It was assumed for convenience that no informal sanction is imposed unless µi = 1. Note, though, 
that everyone in this equilibrium is perceived as having a strictly positive probability of being a 
hater (µi > 0). Even if some sanctions were imposed on everyone (or all nonhaters suffered some 
cost from even a small probability of being thought to be a hater), the equilibrium above would 
continue to hold, as long as this cost were small relative to the sanction CI(1) imposed on those 
known (with certainty) to be haters. 
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 3.2.4) Equilibria with both Formal and Informal Sanctions 
 Now consider the case where there exist both formal and informal sanctions for hate 
speech. First, note that Remark 3 still applies in this context – there does not exist any perfectly 
separating equilibrium. The partially separating equilibrium of Proposition 1 is modified as 
follows: 
Proposition 3: Suppose that CF > 0 is imposed on speech in (γ, 1] and is sufficiently large to 
deter all violations; suppose also that CI(1) > 0 is sufficiently small (as in Proposition 1). Then, 
the following partially separating equilibrium exists: 
     vi = xi* if xi*∈[0, xR] 
     vi = xR if xi*∈(xR, γ) 
     vi = γ if xi*∈[γ, 1] 
     µi = 1 if vi > xR, and µi = 0 otherwise 
Proof:  Analogous to proof of Proposition 1. 
This is identical to the equilibrium in Proposition 1, except that now the haters pool among 
themselves, all expressing the most extreme position consistent with the law (as in the 
equilibrium in Remark 2). Thus, while the number of haters is revealed perfectly, the intensity of 
hatred is now hidden.  
 When informal sanctions are large, the same equilibrium as in Proposition 2 holds. The 
existence of formal sanctions does not make any difference here, as the entire population wishes 
to pool on vi = 0 in response to the informal sanctions alone. In general, formal sanctions only 
have an independent effect on behavior when informal sanctions are relatively small. The main 
impact of formal sanctions is to prevent separation among haters, thus depriving potential 
offenders of information about the distribution of true views within the extremist community. 
When sufficiently large, informal sanctions can also create uncertainty about the number of 
haters. 
3.3) A Neutrality Result 
 We have seen in the previous subsection that the degree to which speech is regulated 
(whether by formal or informal sanctions) helps to determine what views individuals are willing 
to express in public, and hence affects the degree of uncertainty about social attitudes. The 
central insight of this paper is that, when individuals care about the esteem they receive from 
others, the amount and variety of speech (through its effect on this uncertainty) will in general 
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affect conduct. In the particular application developed in this paper, the costliness of hate speech 
(and the consequent level of uncertainty concerning ρ) will generally affect the level of hate 
crime. However, we begin by specifying a (quite restrictive) set of circumstances in which 
speech is neutral, in order to provide a benchmark model against which those of Section 4 can be 
compared. Intuitively, a set of sufficient conditions for neutrality are that potential offenders 
have common (correct) priors concerning the distribution of ρ, have an unbiased estimator of ρ 
(i.e. their estimate of the mean of the distribution is the same, regardless of the costliness of hate 
speech), and utility from esteem is linear (i.e. potential offenders are risk-neutral in esteem). 
 In terms of our model, a speech regime can be characterized simply by the levels of 
formal and informal sanctions (CF and CI). Each such regime will give rise to a probability 
distribution over ρ. Earlier, the cdf of this probability distribution was denoted by F(⋅). Let the 
expected utility to a potential offender from committing a hate crime be denoted by VF, where: 
    V  ∫+−= 1
0
(4)                                                         )()( dzzfzuCBF
Now, suppose that a different speech regime gives rise to a distinct probability distribution, with 
cdf G(⋅) and pdf g(⋅). Then, the expected utility to a potential offender from committing a hate 
crime is VG, where: 
    V  ∫+−= 1
0
(5)                                                         )()( dzzfzuCBG
We make the following assumptions (all of which will be relaxed in subsequent sections of the 
paper): 
A1: (“Common Priors and Public Signals”) In each speech regime, the only information about ρ 
available to any potential offender is given by F(⋅) (in the first regime) or by G(⋅) (in the other 
regime). 
This entails that no individual receives any private signals pertaining to the value of ρ. In 
addition, it requires that the prior beliefs of all individuals (before observing the views expressed 
in equilibrium) concerning ρ are the same. As discussed further below, A1 is not strictly 
necessary for the neutrality result; however, it is a convenient starting point for the analysis. 
A2: (“Unbiased Estimation”) F(⋅) and G(⋅) have the same expected value – i.e. 
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This assumption entails that potential offenders have available an unbiased estimator of ρ: a 
different speech regime may give rise to a probability distribution over ρ with a different 
variance, but the mean will be unaffected. For instance, in the case where greater uncertainty is 
caused by higher costs of hate speech, potential offenders will realize that the lower volume of 
hate speech is in fact due (at least in part) to the higher cost. Consequently, adjusting for this 
effect, the estimate of the expected value of ρ should be unchanged. 
A3: (“Risk-Neutrality”) Potential offenders’ utility from esteem u(ρ) is linear; i.e.  
      u(ρ) = αρ + β 
where α > 0 and β are arbitrary parameters. 
This entails that potential offenders care only about the expected value of ρ, and the other 
moments of the distribution are irrelevant. 
 These assumptions lead straightforwardly to the following neutrality result: 
Proposition 4: Given assumptions A1, A2, and A3, it follows that VG = VF; i.e. the potential 
offender’s incentives to commit the hate crime are unaffected by the speech regime. 
Proof:      ∫+−= 1
0
4) (from                                                         )()( dzzfzuCBV F
           A3)(using                                                 )()(
1
0
∫ ++−= dzzfzCB βα
          =  ∫ ++−
1
0




  Using A2 and the property that F(1) = 1: 
                     =  βα∫ ++−
1
0
  )( dzzzgCB
          =  GV
This result establishes a set of conditions under which speech does not matter for conduct. In this 




3.4) Extending the Neutrality Result: Dispersed Priors and Private Signals 
Assumption A1 entails that every individual begins the game with the same prior 
distribution of beliefs over the possible values of ρ (the proportion of haters in society), and that 
no individual receives any informative signal about ρ that is not publicly available to all 
individuals. As noted earlier, A1 is not strictly necessary for the neutrality result; here, we extend 
the result to certain types of cases with dispersed priors and private signals. First, consider 
relaxing the common priors assumption, while maintaining the assumption that all signals are 
publicly observable. Given A3, potential offenders care only about the expected value of the 
random variable representing the number of racists. Thus, suppose that each individual begins 
the game with a prior belief, denoted φ, about the mean number of haters. As before, individuals 
are also heterogeneous in their intrinsic tastes for committing the crime (i.e. their values of (B - 
C)), but suppose for now that the distribution of priors is independent of the distribution of tastes.  
The assumption of dispersed priors entails that each individual starts with a (possibly) 
biased estimate of ρ. However, suppose that the priors are correct on average – that is, the 
distribution of prior beliefs across the population corresponds to the prior distribution over ρ 
(given by the cdf F(⋅)) assumed in the earlier analysis. In other words, the fraction of the 
population that holds a prior belief that ρ < x0 (i.e. for whom φ < x0) is the same as the 
probability mass associated (in the earlier model) with values of ρ < x0; i.e. F(x0). 
Given these assumptions about dispersed priors, consider a situation where hate speech is 
sufficiently costly that a perfect pooling equilibrium occurs (where all individuals send the same 
message). Then, there can be no updating of the prior beliefs (the φ’s) with which individuals 
entered the game. A potential offender who is contemplating committing a hate crime will thus 
use her prior belief φ to decide whether to commit the crime. Using Eq. (4) and the reasoning in 
the proof of Proposition 4, a potential offender with tastes given by (B - C) will commit the 
crime if: 
B – C + αφ + β > 0 
Rearranging this expression, it follows that the ex ante probability that this individual will 
commit the crime, given her value of (B – C), is: 







βϕ BCFBC  
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 Now suppose that instead of a pooling equilibrium, we have a perfectly separating 
equilibrium. Then, the true value of ρ is revealed precisely to all individuals. A potential 
offender with tastes (B – C) will then update her prior beliefs and use the true ρ. Thus, she will 
commit the crime if: 
B – C + αρ + β > 0 
A government or private actor choosing whether to regulate hate speech has to decide on a policy 
before it knows the true value of ρ - all it knows at the decisionmaking stage is the prior 
distribution of ρ, given by F(⋅). Thus, the ex ante probability that an individual with tastes (B – 
C) will commit the crime when there is complete (public or private) regulation is given by Eq. 
(7) above. The probability that the same individual will commit the crime under a regime of no 
(public or private) regulation is: 







βρ BCFBC  
This, of course, is identical to the probability in Eq. (7). This suggests that, if the dispersed priors 
are correct on average and are independent of tastes, then, ex ante, the expected number of hate 
crimes is unaffected by speech. In other words, under these circumstances, the neutrality result of 
Section 3.3 extends to the case of dispersed priors. 
 This neutrality may appear counterintuitive. After all, more speech leads to more precise 
public signals, causing those individuals who started with particularly high priors to revise their 
beliefs downward. Thus, some of these individuals who may have committed the crime as a 
result of their high priors will not do so when the precise public signals are revealed. However, 
recall that the distribution of prior beliefs is assumed to be independent of tastes for the crime. 
Thus, some potential offenders who have a strong taste for committing the crime will start with 
very low priors. In the absence of further information, they will refrain from committing the 
crime. If, however, precise public signals are revealed, these potential offenders will revise their 
beliefs upwards, causing some of them to commit the crime. Thus, greater precision has two 
offsetting effects; in expectation, they cancel out under the assumptions specified above. 
 An analogous result arises if we assume common priors, but allow each individual to 
receive a private signal about ρ that cannot be communicated publicly (say, from their interaction 
with their immediate circle of peers). As long as the private signals are correct on average, and 
the distribution of the signals is independent of tastes, the neutrality result applies. However, 
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when the priors, or the private signals, are correlated with tastes, then the neutrality result no 
longer holds. This theme is taken up in Section 4 below, where we relax each of the assumptions 
specified in this section in turn, and derive the implications for the effects of speech on hate 
crime. 
 
4) The Effects of Hate Speech on Hate Crime: Alternative Formulations 
 In Section 3 above, we derived a neutrality result: under certain restrictive assumptions, 
the views that are expressed in equilibrium do not affect the aggregate number of hate crimes. In 
more general terms, our conditions describe a set of circumstances in which conduct is 
unaffected by speech. In this section, we relax each of our assumptions in turn, and argue that in 
these more general circumstances, speech can indeed be expected to influence conduct. 
4.1) Relaxing the Assumption of Common or Uncorrelated Priors and Private Signals 
In Section 3.4, we extended our neutrality result to the case of randomly dispersed priors 
and random private signals. We now consider the possibility that priors are neither common nor 
randomly distributed, but are correlated with other characteristics of the individual. In particular, 
we focus on the psychologically plausible possibility that individuals’ prior beliefs are correlated 
with their tastes for committing hate crimes (i.e. their values of (B - C)). In theory, an 
individual’s prior estimates of the mean number of hate crime approvers may be positively or 
negatively associated with the individual’s taste for hate crimes. If priors are positively 
correlated with tastes, then potential hate offenders will initially tend to have a φ that is higher 
than ρ – i.e. to overestimate the mean number of hate crime approvers. Conversely, if priors are 
negatively correlated with tastes, then potential hate offenders will initially tend to underestimate 
ρ.23  
The question we seek to answer is how speech will affect behavior under these 
circumstances. (As discussed below, we believe that the behavioral assumption of correlated 
priors makes the most sense when combined with a behavioral assumption of non-Bayesian 
updating. For now, however – following the standard practice of relaxing one assumption at a 
time – we retain the assumption that individuals engage in Bayesian inference.) Suppose that 
                                                 
23 We ignore the case of “anti-haters” with preferences against hate crimes because they are inframarginal with 
respect to the crime. Obviously, if priors are negatively correlated with tastes, anti-haters will initially overestimate 
the mean number of hate crime approvers; if priors are positively correlated with tastes, anti-haters will tend to 
underestimate the mean. 
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haters start with a high estimate φ of ρ, and that we move from a perfect pooling equilibrium to a 
separating equilibrium. Under the perfect pooling equilibrium, there can be no updating, so 
haters simply use their prior φ in their decisionmaking process. In a perfectly separating 
equilibrium, ρ will be revealed precisely. More generally, a reduction in the costliness of hate 
speech will lead to more hate speech, but it will be clear to haters that there is not as much hate 
speech as would be consistent with their prior beliefs. Thus, they will revise their beliefs 
downwards in the direction of the true ρ. Lowering the estimated ρ in turn lowers the expected 
utility of hate crimes, and therefore, reduces hate crime (of course, there will be some nonhaters 
who start with low φ’s, and update their beliefs upwards, but they are not likely to commit hate 
crimes). Conversely, if potential hate offenders tend to initially underestimate ρ, greater 
signaling will cause them to raise their estimate of the mean, thereby raising the expected utility 
of hate crimes, and therefore the number of hate crimes. 
In general, the effect of more speech will be to move beliefs towards the true ρ. Thus, if 
we relax only the assumption of common or uncorrelated priors, the crucial question is whether it 
is more likely that those priors are positively or negatively associated with tastes. We know of no 
social science evidence precisely addressing this question, but there is a general body of social 
psychological research from which one can draw a strong conclusion. The “false consensus 
effect” and “social projection” refer to the finding that individuals “tend to believe that most 
other people share their own preferences, habits, or sentiments,” (Krueger & Clement, 1997, p. 
299), or at least to overestimate the frequency of their preferences, habits, or sentiments in the 
larger population. Though the strength of the effect varies across circumstances24 and there are a 
few exceptional cases where people instead assume dissimilarity, the basic finding is supported 
across a wide variety of experiments (for reviews, see Krueger (1997); Marks & Miller (1987)). 
Thus, it would seem that the most plausible assumption regarding correlated priors is that  
individuals’ priors are positively associated with their tastes, with the result that potential hate 
offenders overestimate the mean number of hate crime approvers. Under this assumption, 
Bayesian updating will tend to correct the prior by lowering the individual’s estimate. As a 
result, a greater number or variety of signals, including hate speech, will facilitate greater 
                                                 
24 Some studies find, for example, that individuals are less likely to overestimate their typicality when they are 
members of manifestly small, socially deviant subgroups, which means that white supremacists may be less likely to 
make this error (see e.g. Frable (1993)). 
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updating, lowering the mean estimate, and therefore the expected utility of hate crimes, and 
hence the number of hate crimes. 
 A similar argument can be made for the case of private signals. Suppose that each 
individual receives a private signal concerning ρ, and that haters tend to receive signals 
indicating a high ρ (for instance, the signal could be derived from the individual’s immediate 
circle of associates, and it could be that haters tend to associate primarily with other racists). 
Then, more speech (i.e. a more informative public signal) will lead, via Bayesian updating, to 
revision of these beliefs downwards, in the direction of the true ρ, and dissuade them from 
committing the crime. However, there is no offsetting effect of increased crime among those 
initially low signals about ρ, because these individuals are inframarginal with respect to the 
crime. Consequently, lowering the costs of hate speech can reduce the level of hate crime. 
However, we are skeptical about conclusions reached on the basis of an assumption that 
individuals engage in Bayesian inference, while naively failing to correct for systematic biases in 
their priors or private signals. That is, if it is indeed the case that prior beliefs or private signals 
are correlated with tastes, then (given that each individual knows her own tastes), this raises the 
question of why they do not discount those priors or signals to counteract the bias. For instance, 
if haters tend to receive particularly high private signals about ρ (perhaps because they interact 
frequently with other haters), they can adjust their beliefs appropriately to take this into account. 
Hence, we do not believe that it is sensible to relax one standard assumption – common or 
uncorrelated priors – based on psychological evidence without also considering how such 
evidence bears on other elements of the standard rational choice approach. Thus, we next 
consider the possibility of non-Bayesian updating.  
 4.2) Relaxing the Assumption of Bayesian Inference 
 The neutrality result in Section 3 was derived using assumption A2, which gives each 
individual an unbiased estimator of ρ. As a result, when a change in the cost of signaling one’s 
racial view causes a change in the type or quantity of signals individuals send about their racial 
views, individual estimates of the mean of ρ do not change. Although increased signals reduce 
uncertainty in the estimates around the mean, they do not influence estimates of the mean 
because each individual logically attributes a change in signaling behavior to the change in 
external costs of the behavior.  
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Various behavioral studies, however, cast substantial doubt on the assumption of perfect 
Bayesian rationality. These studies do not suggest, of course, that individuals fail to update at all 
in the light of new information. Rather, the evidence suggests that cognitive biases cause 
individuals to deviate systematically from Bayesian inference, making certain predictable errors. 
The existence of bias raises the possibility that an individual’s mean estimate of ρ is sensitive to 
the type or quantity of signals (the amount of hate speech) even when those signals vary only in 
accordance with their costs. If so, then the neutrality result no longer holds. Instead, depending 
on the alternative assumptions one makes, hate speech will raise or lower the mean estimate of ρ 
and therefore raise or lower the amount of hate crime. 
In this section, we explore this issue in detail, focusing on the non-Bayesian assumption 
most justified by the relevant empirical literature. We first consider the effects of relaxing only 
the assumption of Bayesian inference and then the effect of relaxing that assumption in 
combination with an assumption of correlated priors. 
 4.2.1) Introducing the Correspondence Bias (with Common Priors) 
 Once we depart from the assumption of Bayesian inference, the crucial question is 
whether an increase in the number and type of signals that accompanies the change from a 
pooling to a separating equilibrium will systematically influence a potential hate offender’s mean 
estimate of ρ. Two forms of bias are possible: (i) that a greater amount and variety of hate speech 
will cause potential hate offenders to increase their mean estimate of ρ, or (ii) that a greater 
amount and variety of hate speech will cause potential hate offenders to decrease their mean 
estimate of ρ. Either assumption produces a novel, non-neutral result. The basic result of non-
Bayesian inference, therefore, is that any systematic bias produces a link between the amount of 
hate speech and the number of hate crimes. 
 Reaching more specific conclusions requires that we decide in which direction inference 
is likely to be biased. We are not aware of any social science evidence precisely addressing the 
inferential processes of potential hate offenders. Once again, though, there is a general body of 
social psychological research from which one can draw a strong conclusion. The 
“correspondence bias” and “fundamental attribution error” refer to the finding that individuals 
tend to attribute the behavior of others to their internal dispositions or attitudes (in economic 
terms: tastes or beliefs), rather than external situational constraints, to a greater degree than is 
logically warranted. In the words of Jones (1990, p.138), “we see behavior [of others] as 
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corresponding to a disposition more than we should”; moreover, this bias is described as “the 
most robust and repeatable finding in social psychology” (loc. cit.). Miller & Prentice (1996, p. 
803) emphasize the “enormous support” the finding has received over several decades of 
research, while Gilbert & Malone (1995, p.22) conclude that: “In scores of experiments, subjects 
have violated attribution theory’s logical canon by concluding that an actor was predisposed to 
certain behaviors when, in fact, those behaviors were demanded by the situations in which they 
occurred.” 
 We will use an early example from the literature to illustrate. Jones & Harris (1967) 
showed subjects an essay on Cuba that was either pro-Castro or anti-Castro. In two experiments, 
the researchers told the subjects that the essays were written for an exam or for a debate. The 
researchers then told some subjects that the essay writer did not choose the position taken in the 
essay, but had been assigned that position either by the course instructor giving the exam or the 
debate coach. Contrary to the researcher’s expectations, in this “no-choice” condition, the 
subjects evaluated those who had written the pro-Castro essay as holding views that were 
significantly more pro-Castro than those who had written the anti-Castro essay. In other words, 
even though there was a fully sufficient external explanation of the essay’s content – to avoid the 
penalty imposed on those who deviated from the demands of the course instructor or debate 
coach – the subjects still tended to attribute that content to the actual attitudes and beliefs of the 
author. Subsequent studies have replicated this finding using a wide variety of essay topics, and 
have also sought to rule out various competing interpretations. Researchers have concluded that 
the correspondence bias survives various modifications to the experimental design.25 
                                                 
25 For example, some critics contended that there was still significant choice in the “no choice” condition – an 
essayist could have refused the assignment – or that the researcher-created essays demonstrated the kind of 
argumentative expertise that made it appear more likely to reflect the writer’s true position. Snyder & Jones (1974) 
dealt with these two concerns by initially assigning some subjects to write an essay contrary to their own position, 
and then having the subjects evaluate other subjects’ essays. First, those subjects who agreed to write an essay 
contrary to their own view (as everyone who was asked did; no one refused their assignment) should perceive that 
the external constraint of an assignment is fully sufficient to cause someone to produce such an essay. Second, 
essays written by subjects who held contrary views should not contain argumentative expertise correlated with 
actually holding such a view. Notwithstanding these manipulations, however, the researchers still found a significant 
correspondence bias, even among subjects who had written an essay contrary to their own position and who had then 
evaluated an essay contrary to the author’s own position. That is, when the researchers gave a “no-choice” essay to a 
subject who had written a “no-choice” essay, the latter subject erroneously evaluated the author as holding attitudes 
corresponding to the position taken in the essay. Researchers did not manage to fully extinguish the correspondence 
bias until they introduced a condition making it clear to the evaluating subject that the target subject had merely 
copied by hand an essay written by someone else (Snyder & Jones 1974; Jones, 1979).  
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Thus, the psychological evidence strongly commends the assumption that individuals are 
not perfect Bayesians, but are biased in the direction of inferring too strongly that attitudes 
correspond with behavior. Applied to hate speech, this bias suggests that individuals are likely to 
over-attribute another individual’s hate speech to his racist attitude and likely to over-attribute 
another individual’s failure to engage in hate speech (or his engaging in anti-hate speech) to the 
absence of a racist attitude. The inference individuals will fail to make, at least to the full extent 
Bayesian reasoning requires, is that an individual who does not engage in hate speech was 
deterred from doing so by the external costs of such speech (and that an individual who engages 
in anti-hate speech was induced to do so by the external benefits of such speech). Thus, even 
though it may be logical to estimate the same mean number of hate crime approvers in the 
presence of either (1) low hate speech costs and a high level of hate speech and (2) high hate 
speech costs and a low level of hate speech, the correspondence bias means that individuals will 
infer a higher level of hate attitudes when there is a higher level of hate speech. Put differently, 
because the bias is to assume that attitudes “correspond” to behavior to a greater degree than is 
actually the case, deterring the behavior of hate speech will lower the perceived estimate of 
individuals with racist attitudes. Lowering the estimate of hate crime approvers in turn lowers the 
expected utility from committing hate crime, and therefore, lowers hate crime. Thus, if we 
replace the assumption of Bayesian inference with one of correspondence bias, the result is that 
hate speech is one cause of hate crime. 
4.2.2) The Correspondence Bias in Combination with Correlated Priors 
We noted above that we believe that it is more plausible either to maintain both standard 
rationality assumptions – common or uncorrelated priors with Bayesian inference – or to replace 
both with some empirically defensible alternatives. For the sake of completeness, we have just 
examined the effect of relaxing the rationality assumptions one at a time: (1) correlated priors 
with Bayesian inference and (2) common or uncorrelated priors with a correspondence bias. Now 
we consider the effect of relaxing both original assumptions and assuming (more plausibly) (3) 
correlated priors with a correspondence bias. 
Once one abandons the assumption of Bayesian inference, the implications of correlated 
priors for the relationship between hate speech and hate crime change dramatically. If priors are 
positively or negatively correlated, potential hate offenders will, respectively, overestimate or 
underestimate the number or intensity of hate crime approvers. This bias will influence the level 
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of hate crime; however, our interest is in how this level changes in response to changes in the 
cost of hate speech. In the absence of Bayesian inference, we can no longer assume that more 
information will cause individuals to update their beliefs in the direction of the true parameter 
values. If potential hate offenders tend to overestimate the number of hate crime approvers 
(which, as we noted above, is highly likely), the crucial question remains whether an increase in 
the quantity and variety of signals – a move to a separating equilibrium – will cause them to 
overestimate to a greater or lesser degree. Conversely, if potential hate offenders tended to 
underestimate the number of hate crime approvers, the key question is whether an increase in 
hate speech will cause them to underestimate more or less. 
As we just demonstrated, the correspondence bias suggests a clear answer. Where costs 
deter hate speech, individuals will nonetheless erroneously attribute lower levels of hate speech 
to a lower frequency of racist attitudes that favor hate crime. Conversely, where decreased costs 
produce a rise in hate speech, individuals will tend erroneously to attribute higher levels of hate 
speech to a higher frequency of attitudes favoring hate crimes. To clarify this, consider a 
situation where haters start with high priors φ, and we move from a perfect pooling equilibrium 
with no hate speech to a separating equilibrium with some hate speech. If they were to engage in 
Bayesian inference, haters would revise their beliefs downward (as explained in Section 4.1). 
When their inferential processes are affected by the correspondence bias, however, they will 
attribute the increase in hate speech at least partly to ρ being higher than they previously thought 
(a consequence of failing to take fully into account that the costs of hate speech are now lower). 
Hence, haters will revise their beliefs upward (even further away from the true ρ). Note that if 
haters were to start with low priors, the updating would also be upwards (though this time in a 
direction closer to the true ρ). 
Thus, even if potential hate offenders overestimate the number of hate crime approvers 
(as is likely), they will overestimate more in the presence of high levels of hate speech than they 
will in the presence of low levels of hate speech. Conversely, if potential hate offenders 
underestimate the number of hate crime approvers, they will underestimate less with high levels 
of hate speech than with low levels. Thus, given both behavioral assumptions together – 
correlated priors and a correspondence bias in updating – hate speech will tend to increase the 
expected value of, and therefore the amount of, hate crime.  
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4.3) Relaxing the Assumption of Risk-Neutrality 
 So far, we have maintained the assumption A3 of risk-neutrality in esteem. In this 
section, we consider, in turn, the alternative assumptions of risk-aversion (concavity) and risk-
preferring behavior (convexity), while reinstating all the other assumptions (A1 and A2) of 
Section 3.3, and discuss the theoretical and empirical arguments for the different assumptions 
concerning risk attitudes. The effects of concavity and convexity on the incentives to commit 
hate crimes are arguably only of second-order compared to factors (discussed in Sections 4.1 and 
4.2) that affect the mean of the distribution of beliefs. Nonetheless, we consider it important to 
consider the implications of relaxing A3, particularly because that assumption is non-standard 
(unlike A1 and A2) and behaviorally implausible.  
 4.3.1) The Effects of Hate Speech Assuming Concave Utility 
Consider the following assumption: 
A3′: (“Strict Concavity”) u′′(ρ) < 0 
Recall that in Section 3.3 we assumed two different speech regimes, each associated with a 
probability distribution over ρ, with the cdf’s denoted by F(⋅) and G(⋅). Now, assume further that 
(without loss of generality), the speech regime that leads to G(⋅) is more restrictive of hate 
speech, and so leads to greater uncertainty about ρ. We maintain the earlier assumption (A2) of 
unbiased estimation, so that the distributions have the same expected values. However, there is 
more density in the tails of the distribution given by G(⋅):26 
A4: F(⋅) dominates G(⋅) by the criterion of second-order stochastic dominance. 
This entails that the distribution represented by G(⋅) is “riskier” than that represented by F(⋅) (see 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970; Lippman and McCall, 1981, pp. 215-216; Mas-Colell, Whinston 
and Green, 1995, pp. 197f). Note that, because we maintain assumption A2 in the analysis that 
follows, we focus not on the general case where F(⋅) dominates G(⋅) by second-order stochastic 
dominance, but on the special case where the random variables have the same mean – i.e. a 
mean-preserving spread. 
In these circumstances, it proves convenient to represent the new random variable as the 
sum of the old random variable Z (with cdf F(⋅)) and a random variable R with zero mean     
                                                 
26 For example, assume that the total population is 10,000. Then, suppose f(⋅) is the pdf of the uniform distribution 
over [50, 150] and that g(⋅) is the pdf of the uniform distribution over [0, 200]. 
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(E(R) = 0) and strictly positive variance (as in Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 197). Thus, the new 
random variable Z + R has cdf G(⋅), while R has cdf H(⋅) and pdf h(⋅). The net benefit to a 
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Denoting the net benefit under the low-cost regime by VF, it follows straightforwardly that: 
Proposition 5: Given A1, A2, A3′ and A4, VF > VG 
Proof:  Note that: 
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Hence, VF > VG 
 
Thus, when the utility function of potential offenders is concave in esteem, a higher degree of 
uncertainty about the number of racists who will confer esteem lowers the net benefits that are 
expected from committing hate crimes. Thus, a separating equilibrium (associated with low hate 
speech costs) will cause more hate crime than a partially or perfectly pooling equilibrium 
(associated with high hate speech costs).27 
                                                 
27 We focus on the creation of uncertainty through (public or private) measures that raise the costs of (i.e. ‘tax’) hate 
speech. However, it is also possible that uncertainty could be created by subsidies for hate speech: if everyone 
engaged in hate speech, then there would be just as much uncertainty as when noone does so. While we feel obliged 
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 4.3.2) The Effects of Hate Speech Assuming Convex Utility  
Now, consider the assumption of convex utility: 
A3′′: (“Strict Convexity”) u′′(ρ) > 0 
It then follows that: 
Proposition 6: Given A1, A2, A3′′ and A4, VG > VF 
Proof: Analogous to that of Proposition 5. 
Thus, assuming a utility function that is convex in esteem leads to the opposite conclusion to that 
of Proposition 5: a pooling equilibrium (associated with low hate speech costs) will reduce 
uncertainty about the number of racists and thereby tend to discourage hate crimes. 
 4.3.3) The Case for Concavity: Theory and Evidence 
 Given that the results and policy implications of the assumptions of concavity and 
convexity differ so dramatically, it is crucial to decide which of these assumptions to adopt. In 
this section, we discuss the theoretical and empirical grounds for believing that concavity is the 
more reasonable assumption. As a theoretical matter, concavity is very much the standard 
assumption in economic analysis, and is supported by a wide range of empirical evidence, as 
well by the notion of diminishing marginal utility. Despite some argument that those who 
commit crimes differ from the rest of the population in their risk preferences,28 it is common in 
economic models of criminal behavior to assume that potential offenders, like the rest of the 
population, have utility functions that are concave in ordinary consumption goods (see e.g. 
Polinsky and Shavell (1979)). Thus, the question is whether esteem is like an ordinary 
consumption good.  
On one view, esteem is merely valued instrumentally, as a means of gaining goods valued 
for ultimate consumption. Accordingly, esteem is like money. If esteem is valued only as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
to raise this as a theoretical possibility, it should be stressed that if we relax A2 (as in section 4.2), then the 
correspondence bias would imply that potential offenders would be encouraged to commit hate crimes by the 
increased level of hate speech induced by a subsidy. 
28 Specifically, criminals are said to be less risk-averse, or even to be risk-preferring, with the latter claim often 
being made with reference to the idea that criminals respond more to increases in the probability of detection than to 
increases in the sanction (Becker, 1968). See, e.g., Block and Gerety (1995) (finding that prisoners respond more to 
increases in probability of detection than increases in sanction, unlike the control group of students). However, this 
notion of risk-loving behavior (and hence a utility function that is not concave) is thought to apply primarily to 
nonmonetary sanctions (in particular, incarceration). Thus, risk attitudes towards ordinary consumption goods 
appear to differ from risk attitudes towards prison time. There is no warrant, however, for extrapolating from 
attitudes towards prison time to attitudes towards esteem. (In any event, it may be possible to explain a greater 
responsiveness to increases in the probability of detection than to increases in sanctions even while assuming risk 
aversion, for instance, using a model of state-dependent utility - see e.g. Neilson and Winter (1997)). 
 27
means to gaining ordinary consumption goods, and the individual’s utility function for those 
consumption goods is concave, then it follows that the individual’s utility function for esteem is 
concave (just as it is for money). On another view, however, esteem is valued intrinsically, as an 
ultimate consumption good (see McAdams, 1997). Because risk attitudes towards specific kinds 
of goods can differ, there is no warrant for merely assuming that the utility function for 
intrinsically valued esteem is concave (though there is also no warrant for any other assumption).  
There is, however, some psychological evidence suggesting that individuals behave as if 
their utility functions are concave in esteem. In a series of experiments beginning with Asch 
(1951), psychologists have found that individuals will conform to group judgments, but that 
there is a substantial difference in conformity depending on whether the group is otherwise 
unanimous or otherwise has one dissenter. In the original Asch experiment, a subject was asked 
to express his perception of which of three lines was closest in length to a fourth line in front of 
four to six others (who were confederates of the experimenter). When the subject gave his 
answer after the confederates had given the obviously wrong answer, the subject “conformed” 
and gave the same obviously wrong answer approximately 32% of the time (Asch, 1951, p. 181). 
However, in another experimental condition, in which the unanimity was broken by having just 
one confederate give the correct answer, the degree of the subjects’ conformity dropped 
precipitously to approximately 5.5% (Asch, 1951, p. 186). Many experiments confirm this effect 
in a variety of settings (for a recent cross-cultural review, see Bond & Smith (1996)). Subsequent 
studies also demonstrate that the effect is not primarily informational; there is much less 
conformity when subjects are allowed to report their belief privately (see the studies cited in 
Aronson (1992, p. 24)). Thus, we would conclude, the desire to gain esteem and avoid disesteem 
is what causes the conformist behavior. 
These experiments were obviously not designed to test whether utility in esteem is 
concave. Nonetheless, we read the dramatic drop in conformity due to a single dissenter as 
supporting diminishing marginal utility from esteem. Moving from unanimity to a lone dissenter 
changes the subject’s esteem calculus as the number of potential esteemers for giving the right 
answer moves from zero to one. Given that over three-quarters of conformity disappears in this 
single step, we know that subsequent steps - adding more dissenters - cannot have as strong an 
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effect. One interpretation is that the first unit of esteem generates more utility than subsequent 
units.29 Thus, the evidence appears to support concavity of the utility function. 
4.4) Conclusion 
This section demonstrates the possibility of non-neutral results, where speech does 
influence behavior. Under the most plausible assumptions, increasing the costs of hate speech 
will decrease hate crime. The basic model and the alternative formulations developed above can 
be extended in a number of directions. For instance, our model focuses on utility from the esteem 
conferred by like-minded individuals; however, incorporating the disesteem conferred on the 
offender by the general community does not fundamentally change the conclusions. Due to space 
constraints, we do not consider some interesting additional possibilities that would strengthen the 
paper’s results.30  
5) Policy Extensions and Caveats 
The basic model reveals a novel mechanism that links speech and conduct. By 
considering the pursuit of esteem, the model explains how individuals “persuade” one another 
through speech – by providing information about what behavior will be esteemed or disesteem. 
As applied to hate speech, the model suggests a possible policy tool for influencing the number 
of hate crimes: formal or informal sanctions to increase the costs of hate speech. 
There are, however, a number of important caveats and qualifications to this policy 
implication of our analysis. Most importantly, nothing in our analysis necessarily supports 
regulation of speech because we do not consider here the costs of such regulation. We do note 
that non-legal, private regulation of hate speech appears to have the ability to raise the costs of 
hate speech. The paper’s analysis therefore applies as much to the existing informal social norms 
and formal organizational rules against hate speech31 as to any potential governmental rules. 
                                                 
29 Alternatively (and for our purposes, essentially equivalently), moving from unanimity to a lone dissenter involves 
moving from n to (n – 1) disesteemers, so the last unit of disesteem generates more disutility than prior units. 
30 For instance, those who commit hate crimes might receive additional utility from the expression of approval they 
receive independent of the number of approvers they believe to exist. It may also be the case that hate speech 
facilitates a process of preference change by which individuals come to approve hate crimes or come to gain 
intrinsically from the commission of hate crimes. The expression of hate speech may also increase the perpetrator’s 
self-esteem, reinforcing the effect due to the esteem she receives from others. 
31 Organizational rules include prohibitions of hate speech by certain private employers, universities, and internet 
service providers. For example, America Online requires that users agree not to post or distribute any content that 
“victimizes, harasses, degrades, or intimidates an individual or group of individuals on the basis of religion, gender, 
sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, age, or disability.” See http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.html. Yahoo and the 
broker site eBay have similar provisions: see http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (paragraph 6a) and  
http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-offensive.html. 
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Nonetheless, private regulations, while free from First Amendment concerns, still impose costs. 
We do not offer any analysis of those costs, so we do not claim that the benefits of even private 
regulation outweigh the costs. We leave these important issues for future research. 
Second, even if it were desirable to raise the costs of hate speech, there is a separate 
question of whether regulation could succeed in doing so. We will not address this issue 
comprehensively, leaving it too for future research, but we will note some ways in which our 
model illuminates the practical issues. Finally, we will also address one potential objection to the 
paper’s analysis – a countervailing claim that hate speech makes hate crime less likely.  
 5.1) Raising the Costs of Hate Speech: Problems of Definition and Anonymity 
Conventional criticisms of hate speech frequently focus on the subjective harm it imposes 
on its targets. This focus, however, creates severe practical obstacles to regulation because it may 
not be possible to prevent that harm. There are two problems. First, there is an unappealing 
trade-off in how one defines hate speech: an overly broad definition may burden non-offensive 
speech, while a narrow definition – one that attempts to raise the costs only for the harmful 
speech – may allow racists to shift to a different form of expression, arguably causing the same 
ill effects on targets as the prohibited expression. American history is full of racially coded 
phrases, whereby one raises racist concerns without explicit references to race. One might claim, 
therefore, that any narrowly targeted regulation will fail to raise the cost of hate speech, while 
any broad regulation is excessively restrictive. A second problem is anonymity. Speakers may 
react to the formal or informal penalties on hate speech by shifting to anonymous speech, writing 
their hate messages on buildings or sidewalks when no one is watching, or distributing such 
messages in untraceable flyers. While this makes detection and enforcement very difficult, it 
may cause the same harm to the targets as would identified (non-anonymous) messages. 
These practical problems are less severe, however, when the harm to be avoided is the 
one we identify: the incentives hate speech gives to potential hate offenders. First, under our 
approach, the definitional trade-off is less stark because a relatively narrow definition of hate 
speech may be sufficient to reduce hate crime. For example, to reduce the expected esteem 
benefits from committing a racially motivated murder, it is only necessary to raise the costs of 
speech that conveys approval of such murders. Because most people disapprove strongly of 
murder, it requires strong and explicit language to convince others than one actually approves of 
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it. One can create the benefit we identify merely by raising the costs of this strong and explicit 
language. 
Second, the problem of anonymous hate speech is likely to be irrelevant in our 
framework. The harm we identify from hate speech is that it conveys credible information about 
the number of individuals who will esteem perpetrators of hate crimes (or do so to a certain 
intense degree). Overt hate speech, where the speakers are clearly identified, provides more 
credible information about the number of hate crime approvers than does anonymous hate 
speech. The reason is that, when one cannot identify the source of many anonymous messages, 
one usually cannot know how many sources there actually are. It is always possible that just one 
individual produces all the anonymous messages (an anonymous message may of course claim to 
represent a large number of individuals, but such claims are usually cheap talk). Thus, potential 
offenders using Bayesian inference will tend to discount anonymous speech in estimating the 
number of approvers.32 Although the correspondence bias suggests that people will infer more 
hate crime approval from more hate speech, it does not suggest any particular bias to this 
discounting of anonymous speech. Thus, if potential offenders are subject to the correspondence 
bias, their downward revision of their estimate following a reduction in the level of identified 
hate speech will not be fully offset even if all or some speakers engage in anonymous speech. 
5.2) Are Hate Speech and Hate Crime Substitutes?    
 Finally, we briefly consider a contrary theory. Our model of the behavior of potential 
offenders has conceptually separated them from speakers – those whose esteem is sought. 
However, it is also possible that the same individual’s choice of speech may interact with her 
decision regarding whether to commit the crime. If so, then hate speech and hate crime may be 
either complements or substitutes. In the latter case, allowing the individual the chance to “blow 
off steam” by engaging in hate speech may reduce the likelihood that she will also commit a hate 
crime; this would represent a caveat qualifying some of the claims we have made in this paper. 
However, it is likely that the distribution of intrinsic utility (B – C) across individuals is such that 
there are very few individuals who would commit a hate crime, even for a high level of esteem, 
while there are many more individuals who may engage in hate speech if the costs are 
sufficiently low. Then, most speakers are inframarginal with respect to the choice of whether to 
commit the crime, while their hate speech does influence the (relatively small number of) 
                                                 
32 For similar reasons, anonymous hate speech will also fail to substantially reduce the variance of this estimate. 
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individuals who are on the margin with respect to the crime. Moreover, the opportunities for 
gaining esteem from racists for being one of a relatively large number of individuals engaging in 
hate speech are severely limited in comparison to the esteem that can be gained by committing 
hate crimes. Thus, any “substitution effect” is likely to be a very minor factor. 
 
6) Conclusion 
 This paper has developed an analysis of the circumstances in which hate speech can 
induce the commission of hate crimes. We have proposed a model in which individuals trade off 
their “expressive utility” from voicing their true opinions against the costs imposed by formal 
and/or informal sanctions on hate speech, and where potential offenders care about the esteem 
they receive from like-minded individuals. We have derived a set of conditions under which 
speech is neutral, and have systematically explored the consequences of departures from those 
assumptions.  
At the most general level, the key insight of this paper is a novel mechanism for relating 
speech and conduct, via the revelation of information about social attitudes. If one assumes that 
individuals value esteem, have incomplete information about what is esteemed and by whom, 
and value expressing their actual views, then, unless our stringent neutrality conditions hold, any 
form of speech thought to reveal the basis of an individual’s esteem judgments will have 
systematic effects on behavior. While we conclude that those assumptions that have the strongest 
empirical support (such as the “correspondence bias” and concavity) imply that raising the costs 
of engaging in hate speech will deter hate crime, our results are primarily intended to be 
illustrative. We hope that our central insight can be further developed and tested in the future, 
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